A newly published essay by journalist Eli Clifton and political scientist Ian Lustick argues that organized pro-Israel advocacy has repeatedly pushed U.S. presidents away from policies they or their senior advisers considered better aligned with American interests. The essay, published by The Guardian and adapted from the authors’ forthcoming book, “Israel’s Lobby: America in the Grip of a Foreign Power,” traces that claim from Harry Truman’s recognition of Israel in 1948 through President Donald Trump’s Middle East decisions in 2026.

The piece is an argument, not a neutral institutional history, and its central conclusion is contested. Clifton, a co-founder and senior adviser at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, and Lustick, a University of Pennsylvania political scientist emeritus who served in the Carter administration, contend that presidents have often feared electoral, financial and reputational consequences for pressuring Israeli governments. Supporters of the U.S.-Israel alliance say the relationship instead rests on shared security interests, intelligence cooperation, military technology, democratic affinity and broad public support, not coercion by a foreign power.

The authors begin with Truman. In May 1948, his advisers were divided over whether the United States should quickly recognize the new State of Israel. Secretary of State George C. Marshall and other national-security officials warned that recognition could intensify regional conflict, damage relations with Arab governments and complicate access to oil. Truman’s political advisers emphasized domestic support for Zionism and the electoral importance of Jewish voters, particularly in New York. The Truman Presidential Library confirms both the domestic political pressure and Marshall’s opposition. Truman ultimately recognized Israel on May 14, minutes after its declaration of independence.

Clifton and Lustick treat that decision as the opening example of a recurring pattern: a president weighs a policy intended to create distance from Israel, pro-Israel organizations mobilize in Congress and electoral politics, and the administration retreats or narrows its demands. Their account places particular emphasis on AIPAC, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, while also describing a broader network of donors, advocacy groups, political operatives, religious organizations and policy institutions.

Gerald Ford’s 1975 “reassessment” of U.S. policy is another major case. After Secretary of State Henry Kissinger failed to secure an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt, Ford told Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin that he had ordered a review to protect America’s wider interests in the Middle East. The State Department’s historical record preserves that letter. The authors argue that a lobbying campaign, including a Senate letter signed by 76 members, sharply limited Ford’s leverage and helped end the reassessment.

The essay then moves through Jimmy Carter, George H.W. Bush and Barack Obama. Carter sought a broader settlement that included Palestinian political rights but faced warnings that his position could carry a domestic political cost. Bush temporarily resisted Israeli settlement policy by delaying loan guarantees and publicly complained about the scale of lobbying on Capitol Hill. Obama entered office seeking a settlement freeze and renewed two-state negotiations, but his confrontation with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu narrowed as congressional opposition and political pressure increased.

In the authors’ telling, Joe Biden represented a different form of continuity. Rather than being forced from a skeptical position, Biden had a longstanding personal and political commitment to Israel. Clifton and Lustick argue that this commitment, reinforced by memories of earlier political fights, made his administration reluctant to use U.S. military aid and diplomatic protection as leverage during Israel’s campaign in Gaza after the Hamas-led attacks of Oct. 7, 2023.

The book’s most immediate target is Trump. The authors say his 2026 decision to join Israel’s war against Iran contradicted his campaign promise to avoid new Middle East wars and reflected the same pressure structure that constrained earlier presidents. That interpretation is likely to be debated. Trump’s decisions can also be explained by his own strategic preferences, his administration’s view of Iran as a direct threat, Republican support for Israel and close alignment between U.S. and Israeli security officials. Presidents retain agency, and lobbying alone cannot account for decisions involving war, alliances and intelligence assessments.

AIPAC rejects the idea that it acts on behalf of a foreign government. The organization says it is funded and directed by Americans, represents millions of members and works through lawful lobbying, campaign support and grassroots advocacy to strengthen a mutually beneficial alliance. It argues that U.S.-Israel cooperation improves missile defense, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and protection of American forces. In February, AIPAC praised Congress for approving $3.3 billion in security assistance to Israel and $500 million for joint missile-defense programs, illustrating how deeply the relationship remains embedded in bipartisan budgeting.

Yet the political environment is changing. Gallup reported in February that 41% of Americans sympathized more with Palestinians and 36% more with Israelis, the first time Israelis did not hold a clear advantage in the measure. Pew Research Center found in March that 60% of U.S. adults held an unfavorable view of Israel and 59% had little or no confidence in Netanyahu’s handling of world affairs. The shift has been especially pronounced among Democrats and younger Americans, while Republicans remain substantially more supportive of Israel.

Those numbers help explain why the book’s argument is arriving at a consequential moment. Pro-Israel groups retain major influence in Congress, campaign finance and foreign-policy institutions, but public opinion is less uniformly supportive than it was for most of the postwar period. Candidates critical of Israeli policy increasingly compete in Democratic primaries, and some Republicans aligned with Trump’s “America First” movement question military commitments abroad, including in the Middle East.

The debate also requires precision. “The Israel lobby” is not a single organization, and Jewish Americans do not hold one political view. Criticism of lobbying practices, campaign spending or Israeli government policy is legitimate; assigning collective responsibility to Jews, or treating Jewish identity as evidence of divided loyalty, is false and antisemitic. A serious assessment must distinguish between specific organizations, disclosed political activity, voter preferences, strategic arguments and unlawful foreign influence.

Clifton and Lustick ultimately call for a U.S. policy that evaluates Israel as it would any other partner: by measurable American interests, legal obligations, regional stability and the costs of military involvement. Their prescription would not bar pro-Israel advocacy. It would require presidents and lawmakers to withstand political pressure, openly debate aid and military commitments, and apply comparable standards to Israeli and Palestinian conduct. Whether readers accept their historical thesis or not, the book is likely to intensify a widening argument over who shapes U.S. Middle East policy and whether the old bipartisan consensus can survive the Trump era.