Diplomatic channels between Washington and Tehran remained open Friday even as U.S. and Iranian forces traded attacks and the dispute over the Strait of Hormuz pushed the June ceasefire framework toward collapse. The next phase will depend not only on formal demands but on the negotiating styles of four central figures: Vice President JD Vance, special envoy Steve Witkoff, presidential adviser Jared Kushner and Iran’s parliament speaker and chief negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

Their approaches point toward four different, potentially complementary tracks. Vance is positioned to make the political tradeoffs that only a senior White House official can authorize. Witkoff favors rapid, transactional bargaining around concrete deliverables. Kushner is likely to seek a broader regional package involving Gulf mediators and linked conflicts. Ghalibaf, operating inside Iran’s security-heavy political system, is likely to insist that any compromise produce visible, reciprocal gains that can be defended at home.

The immediate diplomatic challenge is narrower than a comprehensive peace agreement but still formidable: stop the exchange of attacks, establish workable navigation rules in the strait and create a credible process for nuclear and sanctions negotiations. Mediators from Pakistan, Qatar and Egypt continue to work the backchannel, according to regional officials cited by The Associated Press.

Vance’s likely role is that of political closer and strategic coordinator. He has publicly argued that military power and diplomacy are tools that can be used together, while rejecting the idea that repeated bombing alone can settle the conflict. That suggests he would favor a phased arrangement: an immediate halt to attacks, enforceable shipping rules and a timetable for the larger nuclear dispute.

Such an approach would allow the White House to preserve its claim that pressure created leverage while acknowledging that control of the Strait of Hormuz cannot be resolved sustainably through airstrikes and naval operations alone. Vance would also be the negotiator best placed to decide which Iranian commitments are sufficient for President Donald Trump to pause military action and which U.S. concessions can survive opposition in Washington.

Witkoff would probably take the most transactional approach. His recent diplomacy has emphasized direct problem-solving, flexible formats and a search for terms that leaders can approve quickly. In the current crisis, that would mean concentrating first on measurable actions: which routes commercial ships may use, who verifies compliance, whether Iran may inspect or direct traffic, and what economic steps follow if attacks stop.

The advantage of Witkoff’s style is speed. A narrow shipping agreement could reduce immediate risks to sailors, Gulf infrastructure and energy markets before negotiators attempt to settle the nuclear file. The danger is that a fast political understanding can leave critical language ambiguous. The June memorandum’s competing interpretations of navigation rights show how imprecise drafting can turn an interim compromise into the basis for renewed confrontation.

Kushner would be most likely to frame the talks as a regional bargain rather than a bilateral U.S.-Iran transaction. Recent negotiations have involved Qatar and Pakistan, while Egypt has participated in efforts to revive diplomacy. The agenda has also become entangled with Lebanon, Israel, frozen Iranian assets and the security expectations of Gulf Arab governments.

A package approach could give each side more ways to claim gains. Iran could receive economic relief or guarantees tied to de-escalation; Gulf states could seek freer navigation and protection from missile and drone attacks; Washington could pursue nuclear limits and regional restraint. But adding issues also multiplies veto points. Israel, Hezbollah, Gulf governments and Iranian security institutions do not share identical priorities, and a deal that depends on every theater moving simultaneously could become too complicated to implement.

Ghalibaf’s approach would start from reciprocity, sovereignty and domestic political durability. He has kept open the possibility of diplomacy while stressing that negotiations cannot be presented as surrender. He has also tied Iran’s continued adherence to the interim framework to U.S. implementation, reflecting Tehran’s insistence that obligations must produce practical benefits rather than promises alone.

On the Strait of Hormuz, Ghalibaf is likely to defend some form of Iranian role in managing navigation while stopping short of arguing for indefinite closure. That creates a possible bargaining zone, but only if the United States can distinguish between arrangements that improve safety and claims that effectively give Tehran control over an international waterway. The wording, monitoring system and dispute-resolution mechanism would be decisive.

The four approaches could fit together if negotiators divide the process into levels. Vance could define the political boundaries and secure presidential approval. Witkoff could pursue the immediate cessation of attacks and a precise maritime protocol. Kushner could organize incentives and commitments from regional governments. Ghalibaf could test whether the package is acceptable to Iran’s political and security institutions.

Technical negotiators would then need to convert the political bargain into language that leaves little room for contradictory interpretations. Iran’s Kazem Gharibabadi participated in recent Qatar discussions through mediators, while other diplomatic and nuclear specialists would be needed for verification, sanctions sequencing and the future of Iran’s nuclear program.

A credible first-stage agreement would require more than a public declaration. It would need mapped shipping lanes, a communications channel for maritime incidents, rules governing inspections, a process for investigating alleged violations and a sequence linking de-escalation to economic measures. It would also need to specify what happens if one side believes the other has breached the deal.

The central obstacle is that both governments view pressure as leverage. Iran has demonstrated that disruption in the strait can impose global economic costs. The United States has used strikes, sanctions and a naval blockade to raise the cost to Tehran. Each side therefore risks concluding that compromise would surrender an advantage created through force.

That is why the negotiators’ styles matter. A durable outcome would have to combine Vance’s political authority, Witkoff’s focus on executable terms, Kushner’s regional coalition-building and Ghalibaf’s need for reciprocal, defensible concessions. None of those approaches is sufficient alone. Together, they offer a possible path from an unstable ceasefire toward a structured negotiation—provided the military escalation does not outrun the diplomats.