Iran and Russia have both signaled support for a larger Indian role in efforts to ease tensions between Tehran and Washington, using diplomatic events in New Delhi to cast India as a potential longer-term stabilizing force in a crisis that has drawn in the United States, Gulf states, Russia, China and Pakistan.

The remarks, made around the BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting in India and reported over the weekend, do not establish India as a formal mediator. They do, however, mark a visible push by Tehran and Moscow to elevate New Delhi’s role at a time when U.S.-Iran diplomacy remains fragile and Pakistan has been associated with more immediate channels for talks.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said India could play a greater role in advancing peace and stability in West Asia, arguing that the crisis around Iran cannot be settled by military means. Speaking in New Delhi, Araghchi also said Tehran would welcome a constructive Indian role, while stressing that Iran remains wary of Washington and wants any diplomacy to produce a negotiated settlement rather than another cycle of pressure and escalation.

Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, separately suggested that India could be suited to a longer-term mediation role if the United States and Iran seek one. Lavrov acknowledged Pakistan’s role in helping establish dialogue between Washington and Tehran on urgent issues, but described India as a country with extensive diplomatic experience and international standing that could contribute to a broader settlement process.

The distinction is important. Pakistan has been linked to the immediate mechanics of U.S.-Iran contacts, including efforts to keep messages moving between the sides during periods of military tension. India, by contrast, is being framed by Iran and Russia as a larger geopolitical broker: a country with ties to Washington, Tehran, Moscow, Gulf capitals and Israel, and with a major stake in keeping energy routes and regional commerce from collapsing.

For the United States, the development is relevant because any Indian role would sit at the intersection of several U.S. policy priorities. Washington is trying to manage Iran’s nuclear and regional posture, preserve freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, maintain sanctions pressure, and prevent a wider conflict that could hit oil and gas markets. India’s involvement could add diplomatic reach, but it could also complicate U.S. leverage if New Delhi presses for arrangements that preserve Indian economic ties with Iran.

One flashpoint is Chabahar, the Iranian port that India has long viewed as a strategic gateway to Afghanistan, Central Asia and wider Eurasian trade routes while bypassing Pakistan. Araghchi used his New Delhi remarks to urge India to continue work on the project despite U.S. sanctions pressure, calling the port a major symbol of Iran-India cooperation. Indian officials have previously had to balance the port’s strategic value against Washington’s sanctions architecture, and the latest crisis has made that balance more difficult.

The Strait of Hormuz is another central issue. Araghchi said Iran was ready to help vessels pass through the waterway, while also describing the situation there as complicated. Hormuz is one of the world’s most sensitive energy chokepoints, and uncertainty over commercial shipping through the strait directly affects U.S. allies, Asian importers and global markets. India, as a major energy consumer with deep Gulf ties and a large diaspora across the region, has strong incentives to prevent a prolonged maritime crisis.

The BRICS meeting in New Delhi highlighted both India’s diplomatic visibility and the limits of multilateral consensus. The expanded grouping now includes countries with sharply different positions on the Middle East crisis, including Iran and the United Arab Emirates. The meeting ended without a joint statement, underscoring how difficult it is for BRICS to act as a unified diplomatic bloc when its members have divergent security relationships with Washington, Tehran and Gulf capitals.

That lack of consensus may be one reason Tehran and Moscow are emphasizing India specifically rather than BRICS as a whole. India has maintained a careful position through the crisis, urging dialogue and de-escalation while avoiding the kind of direct alignment that would reduce its usefulness as a potential interlocutor. New Delhi’s approach reflects its broader foreign policy posture: close strategic ties with the United States, longstanding defense and energy relations with Russia, civilizational and commercial links with Iran, and expanding economic partnerships with Gulf Arab states.

India has not publicly embraced the role of formal mediator in the way Iran and Russia have described it. New Delhi traditionally prefers terms such as dialogue, engagement and de-escalation, and it often avoids formal mediation labels unless all parties explicitly request its involvement. That caution is likely to continue, particularly because the United States, Iran and Israel each have different expectations for what diplomacy should produce.

Still, the public endorsements from Tehran and Moscow add pressure and opportunity for India. If Washington sees value in New Delhi quietly carrying messages, India could become a supplementary channel alongside Pakistan and other intermediaries. If Washington views the move as an attempt by Iran and Russia to dilute U.S. pressure, India may face sharper questions about Chabahar, sanctions compliance and its dealings with Moscow.

For Tehran, elevating India serves several purposes. It signals that Iran is not diplomatically isolated, encourages a major Asian power to remain engaged despite sanctions, and potentially balances Pakistan’s role in U.S.-Iran contacts. For Moscow, backing India allows Russia to reinforce its partnership with New Delhi, promote a multipolar diplomatic framework and challenge the idea that Washington alone can determine the format of any settlement.

The immediate path remains uncertain. U.S.-Iran talks have repeatedly stalled over security guarantees, nuclear limits, sanctions relief and the future of maritime access in the Gulf. Public statements from Iranian officials show interest in diplomacy, but also deep mistrust of the United States. Russian statements favor a negotiated outcome, but Moscow’s own confrontation with Washington over Ukraine shapes how its proposals are received in Western capitals.

The clearest takeaway is that India is being pulled further into the diplomatic geometry of the crisis, whether or not it accepts a named mediator role. As long as the conflict threatens shipping, energy supplies and regional stability, New Delhi will face pressure from multiple sides to use its access. For Washington, that makes India not just a strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific, but a potentially important variable in one of the most consequential Middle East diplomatic tests now facing the administration.